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InternationJI portfolio diversification is an area of popular academic 
interest. Most of the research is based on linkages hetween developed 
markets or between developed markets and emerging markets. Emerging 
markets have only been a feature of research for periods of crisis and 
contagion such as the emerging market crisis of 1997 and 1998. 
The common argument used to explain the cause of the stock m arket 
linkages is based on economic slowdowns (or deep-recession), large balance 
of payment problems or other macro-economic problems in the emerging 
markets. Contagion or herding behaviour is an alternative explanation to the 
cause of the co-movement of emerging markets. 
Contagion or Herding behaviour is based on the assumption that it is too 
costly to acquire information. Investors thus remain uninformed in the 
countries in which they invest. Investors try to infer future movements in 
one market based on how the rest of the market is reacting. The uniformed 
investors follow the supposedly informed investor. These information 
frictions can make investors follow the market, rather than take the time and 
expense to make their own assessments about the market fundamentals . 
This research aims to identify countries that are regardeJ as similar by 
international investors. Countries that are regarded as similar can be 
grouped together to form separate clusters. This research attempts to 
ascertain as whether there has been any change of perceptions since the 
emerging market crisis of 1997 and 1998, hence any change in the 
composition of above-mentioned clusters. 
The sovereign bond spreads or sovereign bond indices can be interpreted as 
an indicator of international investors' sentiment towards the various 
emerging markets. As sovereign risk of a country decreases (increases) the 
sovereign bond return index increases (decreases) and investment in that 
country's equity would increase (decrease) thus giving us a pOSitIVe 
relationship between the sovereign index and equity index. 
Sovereign risk is an important determinant of stock market movements 
during the crisis period and exerts a greater influence on stock markets than 
it did prior to the crisis. Equity returns are more sensitive to sovereign risk 
after the crisis than before. The geographical location of a country plays an 











The events that had the greatest impact on the integrity of the equity index 
clusters (during the crisis period) were related to concerns over a country's 
currency and the greatest impact on sovereign bond clusters (during the 
crisis period) were largely related to macro-economic problems or 
downgrading of sovereign bonds. It is thus apparent that sovereign risk is 
not a complete and therefore an inadequate measure of international 
investor sentiment towards emerging market equity. There has been a shift 
in the way investors view equity risk relative to sovereign risk. 
Currency risk is less of an explanatory variable than sovereign risk is, for 
equity market returns. However, currency movements proyide a better 
indication of how international investors view emerging markets. The day-to 
day currency movements that take place are largely due to capital inflows 
and outflows. This research identifies groupings of emerging markets based 
on large capital inflows and outflows by performing cluster analysis on 
equity returns less currency returns (as well as currency moving volatilities). 
This identifies linkages that are partly caused by international investor 
sentiment. The problem with using currency movements is the potential 
interference of Reserve Banks as well as the fact that countries that have 
pegged currencies cannot be included in any form of testing. No measure 
that solely and accurately captures international investor sentiment for all 
the emerging oarkets could be found. 
The impact of local investor sentiment on equity markets can be assessed by 
examining the relationship between equity and bonds. There are indications 
that the local investors of SA behave simiIJrly to the local investors in the 
emerging markets of Europe. 
The area of linkages amongst emerging markets continues to be an area that 
requires further research. In the context of international portfolio 
diversification, it is not advisable to invest in countries that are in close 
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International portfolio diversification is an area of popular academic 
interest. Much of the research in this field has been prompted by the search 
for an adequately well-diversified international portfolio. A low correlation 
(or insignificant results from co-integration tests) between stock markets has 
often been presented as evidence supporting potential gains from 
international diversification. For example, Barr & Sharp (1997) use 
correlation based tests while Arshanapalli & Doukas (1993) co-integration 
tests. 
Most of the research is based on linkages between developed markets or 
between developed markets and emerging markets. Emerging markets have 
only been a feature of research for periods of crisis and contagion l such as 
the emerging market crisis of 1997 and 1998 and the Mexican crisis of 
1994/5. 
Linkages between developed markets have often been justified by rational 
reasons such as: 
1. There is generally a significant amount of trade between developed 
markets that has a significant impact on a country economy and thus 
stock market. 
2. There are few capital controls that excessively restrict cross-border 
Investments. 
3. There may be a large number of multi-listed firms across various 
developed markets, thus directly and inJirectly causing the markets to 
follow each other more closely. 
Arshanapalli & Doukas (1993) and Schollhammer & Sand (1985) provide 
the reasons for linkages amongst developed markets in greater detail. The 
above, however, cannot justify linkages between emerging markets. There 
generally is minimal trade between any two randomly chosen emerging 
markets . Emerging markets are usually subjected to capital controls that 
would disallow the outflow of capital and there are not a significant number 
of multi-listeJ companies between emerging markets. The traditional forms 
of testing for market linkages are thus not applicable to emerging markets, 
as there are different reasons as to \~:hy emerging markets would be linked. 
I Conl<J!2 ion has laken on I <triOl!;; Illeilnlngs In re"edlTh bllt IS generally referred to the increase in cross-










Correlation tests can also be an indicator of linkages between emerging 
markets, however Cheung & Ho (1991) and Longin & Solnik (1995) could 
not conclude with certainty that their correlation matrices was stable over 
time~. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of emerging markets and the 
globalisation that has been taking place, limits the period of data available to 
perform such tests. Interestingly, Calvo & Mendoza (2000) identify 
globalisation as a possible cause for contagion. 
The events of 1997 and 1998 indicate a strong amount of linkage between 
emerging markets, as there was a significant amount of co-movement in 
emerging market indices. There have been two approaches at answering why 
emerging markets were linked, particularly during that time period. 
According to Schmukler & Laminsky (1999), the first, more commonly useJ 
argument, the 'fundamental ' approach, argues that the crisis occurred 
because of economic slowdown (or deep-recession), large balance of 
payment problems or other macro-economic problems. 
The second, less commonly, explanation offered to explain emerging market 
linkages is contagion and/ or herding behaviour. Herding behaviour, as 
defined by the literature in the field}, starts with the assumption that it is too 
costly to acquire information. Investors thus remain uninformed in the 
countries in which they invest. Therefore, investors try to infer future 
movements in one market based on how the rest of the market is reacting4• 
The uniformed investors follow the supposedly informed investor. These 
information frictions can make investors follow the market, rather than take 
the time and expense to make their own assessments about the market 
fundamentals. 
Calvo & Mendoza (2000) argue that if a portfolio manager faces a scenario 
where the gain from gathering information does not exceed the costs, there 
exists a range uf multiple equilibria inside of which investors rationally 
choose to mimic market portfolios. When a rumour favours another 
portfolio in that range, all the investors "follow the herd." Globalisation 
exacerbates contagion because the indeterminacy range widens as the 
market of invest able securities grows. 
In Kodres & Pritskcr (1998), the informed investors will sell their assets in 
one country (as a result of some shock) and buy assets in another country. 
The new position can be hedged by selling assets in a third country. 
2 .\ppendix .\ gives the correlation table for several emerg ing markets. No significant relationships can 
be identified o\ er th e different tim e period s 
, Schmuklcr & Lamll1sky (1999) qu ote Ballerjee ( I ()l)2J . 











Uninformed investors will follow informed investors on the notion that the 
informed investors are trading on inside information as opposed to 
attempting to hedge out macro-economic LIctors. The linkage between the 
three countries thus becomes self-fulfilling. 
Herding behaviour theories Jlso make several suggestions about the 
incentives to gdther information; Investors have less of an incentive to 
gather good news in a bull market, and the incentives increase in a bear 
market. However when costly information is expected to produce good 
news, and short-selling constraints limit the gains from learning bad news, 
incentives for buying news are "reak (Calvo & Mendozd, 2000). 
In terms of the definitions of herding behaviour above, investors also infer 
future price movements in one stock market based on movements in other 
stock markets (a non-expensive source of valuable information). Thus, an 
important and underplayed factor that links emerging markets would be 
international investors' perception. This research attempts to identify 
countries that are regarded as similar by international investors (and, thus, 
by the argument above, closely linked) and attempts to ascertain whether 
there has been any change of perceptions since the emerging market crises 
of 1997 and 1998. To establish this it first becomes necessary to identify a 










CHAPTER 2: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
All the data from the sample W~lS collected from Bloombergs and all tests 
were either done on Microsoft Excel or the 'Statistica' (statistics package). 
This research will focus on those countries that have sovereign bonds and 
easily accessible local bond indices in issue. 
Given that the fear of default was a prominent feature of many emerging 
markets during the crisis of 1997 and 1998, some measure of sovereign risk 
is the obvious choice to use as a proxy for international investor perception. 
Indices that reflect the price of all the sovereign bonds in issue are used in 
this research. 
This research is based on the following countries5: Argentina, Brazil, 
Czechoslovakia, China, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Venezuela. 
Various tests either include or exclude certain countries based on data 
availability or for the sake of comparability. 
Two indices were used for China, namely Shanghai A and Shanghai B. 
Shanghai A (hereafter called China A) is based on equity listed on the 
Shanghai stock exchange that only local investors are allowed to invest in 
while Shanghai B (hereafter called China B) is based on equity that 
foreigners can invest in. 
A possible limitation of this research is the quality of data used. Effort was 
made to ensure that the equity indices used were liquid and representative of 
the equi ty6 in the specific country. The indices produced by the Industrial 
Finance Corporation (IFC) would be better in this respect; however, this 
data was not available to the researcher. 
The time period the data is based on ranges from the beginning of 1995 to 
the end of October 2001. Weekly data was preferred over daily data given 
the problems that may arise by the fact that these sample memhers are in 
various time zones. Thus, there were a rotal of 356 data points per time 
senes. 
All regression tests were done using returns as opposed to actual data. 
Indices are generally non-stationary in nature Jnd thus do not comply WIth 
the fundamental assumptions of regression. For cluster analysis the 
' See Appe ncii .x B for Further d e t~il s on the indices Ll sed . 










researcher preferred to utilise actual indices wherever possible as cluster 
analysis is a distance analysis technique. This would thus reduce the 
possibility of incorrect conclusions based on spurious relationships. Cluster 
analysis that included currency data, however, was based on returns as 
emerging market currencies continuously establish new market equilibriums 
after minor currency crisis. 'If the correction is seen as triggering a very 
distortionary policy response that will cripple the economy, the market 
collapse can become part of a self-fulfilling crisis. Another reason would be 
the performance-based incentives. The sharp fall of the Peso on 11 
November 1995 is evidence of this. The fall was triggered by unfounded 
rumours and only recovered marginally after the rumours were discredited' 
(Calvo & Mendoza, 2000). 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter 3 provides a 'Brief Overview of the Emerging Market Crisis' to put 
the research into context. It is assumed that the reader is aware of the details 
of the crisis. This chapter is thus kept short. Chapter 4, The Role of 
Sovereign Risk explains the importance of sovereign risk for the purposes of 
this research. Chapter 4 also details the adjusted methodology that used to 
compensate for the lack of availability of crucial data. 
In the chapter on the Significance of Sovereign Risk (Chapter 5), the returns 
on sovereign bond indices were regressed onto the returns on equity indices 
to establish the significance of sovereign risk in explaining equity returns. 
The results and summary statistics are tabulated thereafter. For comparative 
purposes all tests were done on both equity returns in the local currency as 
well as local index converted into US Dollars. 
In the following chapter on Cluster Analysis (Chapter 6), all the data was re-
indexed so that they have the same starting point. The K-means cluster 
analysis used in this research relies on the Euclidean distances between 
sample members, which can be misstated if the indices are not re-indexed. 
All the results from the cluster tests are reported in the same manner. The 
distances of the cluster members from the cluster centre are in the line 
helow the list of members for the respective cluster. The inter-cluster 
distances are also reported in this format. 
In the latter part of Chapter 6, certain dates were isolated on the basis of the 
integrity of the cluster groups (on those dates). Press reports and analyses 
performed by reputable market commentators were reviewed to identify 










included in Appendix F. This \Y.1S done to giH' us insight into the potenti.1l 
differences between sovereign risk clusters and the index clusters. 
c 
The currency ri.,k anal ysis in Chapter The Role of Currency Risk, is done 
in a simibr !lUlner .1S the soycreign risk ,uulysis. Thereafter in Chapter 8, 
Volatility of E:~change R.nes, the researcher focuses on the relationship 
between curreIlCY movements (both returns as "'ell .1S vo1.nility), bond 
returns ,md equity movements. 
Chapter 9 focuses on Equity risk for ,111 the emerging markets in the sample. 











CHAPTER 3: 1\ BRIEF OVERVIE\,\' OF THE EMERGING !vIARKET 
---- -- ---------------- -------~---- -- --------------
CRISIS 
The equit y indices ~l11d exdunge r~He CbL1 used in this rese~1rch coyers ~11l 
ul1SL1ble period ,)f the global economy. The emerging stock market crises of 
1997 and 1998 s 1\Y almost all the emerging markets suffer large declines in 
their asset pricEs, collapscs in their corpoLHe enyironment and extreme 
financial fra o ilil v, as well as dL1stic economic slowdowl1S. In over a vcar b ./ ./ 
some markets saw their market capitalisation decre~lse by 80% in US Dollar 
terms. Currencies h~ld depreciated by more than is needed to nuinL1in 
competitiveness. Goyernments countered the we,lkness in their currency by 
r~lising interest '"~Hes and selling foreign currencies, which in turn, slowcd 
economic grmnh. 
In Ma\', the Russian financial system had come under severe pressure as the , , 
bond and equity markets slumped, forcing the central bank to triple interest 
rates to lSQO;{)o. 1n August 1998 Russia defaulted after failing to pay its debt 
on their treasury bills. This had a seyere impact on the Latin Americm stock 
and bond nurkE ts. At this point, yields on US Treasury bills re,lChed record 
lows as investors bought into, wlut is regarded as the safest investment, 
given the surroJnding turmoil. 
The cause of the: crises has broadly been attributed to two major factors, 
namely fragile e:onomies b~lsed on inappropriate macro-economic policies 
(this more appr'Jpriately attributed to the Asi~m emerging markets \vhich 
occurred in the atter part of 1997 through to mid 1998) and fear of default 
on government debt, more appropriately attributed to Russia, and (to a 
lesser extent) BL1zii and other Latin American markets, which occurred in 
early 1998 and climaxing in August 1998). This fear of default had even 
affected countries (i.e. the contagion had spre,ld) that h~KI been following 
sound macro-economic policies ,md had the ~lbility to P,lY their debts. 
For the purpos,~s of this research the two crises ,1re treated ,1S one. The 
starting (tne of t be crisis pcriod is \yidd y ~lCccpted ~lS 2] ul Y 1997 (K~lminsk y 
& Schmukler, 11)99) with the devaluation of the Tlui Bhat. A lenient date is 
chosen for the e ld of the crisis, namely, 27 }<ll1lury 1999 ,1fter the Brazili~111 
gcn'ernment ~lllt)\\-s the Re~11 to f1()~1t freel:", \vhich led to ,111 illcre,lse in 
ilwestment in latin Americl11 equit y. 
SULlrl'C http Ilcllr"l, IlCl.ch 1~,t)()llllIlll I hc C~ILI'l" "rlhc \'ldlll:lIldllCl~tI ,lilt! IClllWllllC (1'1'1'. 
dccc-;'ed II~ I I ~IIIIII . 
• StlLlrl'C. http.1I II II .pb; uri! II i!bh p~I;lC, rlOllIllllL' ,htlll , LT~"h ele crUll hlilli. i'rl'IlIIIllC: Ihe 
cr~l,h IllllCllilc urlhc cr I'h. dccc,",l'lill(l I ~ ~IIIIII 
'''I'Lllll' http 111111 pb, (ll.;l lIi!bh P,I;ll" rl"11111l1l' ,h'lll, LT,I·h c'le lll'i1hlllli. 11I'11I1111c'lhc' 










Below is a graph of the average developed market index vs. the average 
emerging market index. l<Yyhe wide gap that develops between the 
developed markets and emerging markets during the emerging market crisis 
indicates the minimal effect, relatively speaking, that the emerging market 
crisis has had on the developed markets. Even though there is a significant 
amount of co-movement, the developed markets recovered at a rapid pace 
from the 'Russian' default crisis when compared to the emerging markets. 
Despite the attention the crisis received in the US11 , it does not seem that 













Graph 1: Average Stock Index (US $) 
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Date 
10 The developed market index was constructed on the basis of equaJly weighting the indices of the G7 
countries (and AustraJia) and re-indexing to 100 for 6 Jan 1995. The emerging market index was 
constructed in a similar manner on the basis of the 17 emerging markets as deftned by the Economist. 
The components of the two samples are included in Appendix B. Each index has 331 data points. 
II Note the CRS report for the US Congress in February 1998 ( Source: http:wwwJas.org/man/crs/crs-











The above graph indicates that developed markets behave differently to 
emerging markets and the traditional arguments, as mentioned in the 
introduction, that are used to justify linkages between developed markets (or 
linkages between emerging markets and developed markets) cannot fully 











CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGN RISK 
Sovereign risk is th<: risk associated with investing in that country. There 
exist several methods of accounting for sovereign risk in the investment 
decision but the most easily observable measure is the sovereign credit 
d12 sprea . 
The sovereign credic spread is calculated by subtracting the yield on US 
Dollar bond (See Appendix C for example) from the yield on the sovereign 
US Dollar bonds (the bonds in question need to be of a similar term and 
nature for the analyds to be meaningful). It is widely assumed that the US 
Dollar bonds are ab~;olutely free of risk. The US Eurodollar bond market is 
the largest however; sovereign bonds in other currencies such as the Yen, 
British Pounds as well as Euros do exist. 
The resultant figure from the calculation above at any point in time is 
interpreted as the incremental rate of return required by investors to 
compensate them for taking on the additional risk of default of investing in 
a lower than absolutely risk free sovereign bond. 
Investors' assessment of a country's sovereign risk (which is what drives the 
sovereign credit sprt·ad) will depend on the investors view on the country's 
ability to repay its debt and hence their assessment of the state of the 
country's economic health and governments control over it. 
THE ADJUSTED METHODOLOGY 
Unfortunately the :-;'elds on Eurodollar bonds needed to calculate the 
sovereign credit spread (for many emerging markets included in this 
research) were not readily available. In the event that they were available, 
they often reflected a lack of liquidity during critical times such as the 
1997/8 crisis (This is because of the fact that there were not sufficient 
buyers for these bonds). In some cases the bonds were not in issue for an 
adequate length of period to perform meaningful analysis. 
The adjusted methodology employed in this research uses Eurodollar bond 
indices. These indices (calculated by JP }.:forgan) track the cumulative 
returns on all the Eurodollar bonds issued by a country (commonly a 
12 The usage of this meth Jdology is only possible for countries that have issued debt in currencies 











developing country). It is a total return index that reflects the price gains and 
interest income from a 'passively' portfolio of traded sovereign bonds. 
There is no need to take into consideration any measure of risk free 'price/ 
index' as we will be subtracting the same time series from all the sovereign 
bond indices. It must be remembered, however, that when a country is 
viewed as more risky than before, the sovereign credit spread would 
increase, whereas the returns (or cumulative returns) will decrease. 
Comparing and contrasting the movement of these indicators with the stock 
market indices will provide us with insight as to whether there has been any 
change in market dynamics amongst emerging markets after the events of 
1997/8. 
Graph 2: Total Cumulative Returns 






























The four continent~ have distinct progressions in their cumulative returns 
on sovereign bond~. The two major crises that occurred in the 1997/8 
period are visible in the above graph of sovereign bond total returns. There 
are two 'dips' in the cumulative total returns for all four continents reflecting 
the periods when there was the greatest doubt on emerging countries to pay 
their debts. The European sovereign bonds suffered the most during the 
latter parts of 1998 largely because of Russia's default on its debt. 
Another independeLt variable to consider is the sovereign credit ratings. It 
,vill allow for a greater coverage of countries. The sovereign credit ratings 
have the most imp2ct on emerging stock markets. New information does 
not alter much the perception of investment conditions in industrialised 
(developed) or least developed countries (Calvo & ~lendoza, 2000). 
On the surface, it would seem that sovereign credit ratings and sovereign 
bond premiums are related and contain similar information. However this is 
not the case. Block & Vaaler (2001) regard the two separately and as being 
influenced by two sl::parate 'investment groups'. In the researchers defence 
Reinhart (Sovereign credit ratings before and after financial crisis) finds 
evidence of two-\\'ay causality between sovereign credit ratings and 
sovereign bond spreads. They also cite Larrain, Reisen and Von :Maltzan 
(1997) as providing strong evidence that credit ratings have a significant 











CHAPTER 5: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVEREIGN RISK 
The Eurobond indices can be interpreted as an indicator of international 
investors' sent.iment. towards the various emerging markets 13. By regressing 
the ret.urns on the sovereign bond market onto the returns on the equity 
market we will be able to establish t.he significance of sovereign risk (or the 
importance internanonal investors play in driving movements) in the 
emerging stock markets. A critical assumption in this chapter and the 
next is that the Eurobond indices are adequate proxies for 
international invest or sentiment. 
Weekly returns of the sovereign bonds were regressed onto index returns 
for the three different time periods, namely, pre-crisis, during crisis and post 
crisis. The sample sizes were 131, 81 and 144 (per time series) respectively. 
The regressions were performed on the basis of the model noted below, on 
both the indices in local currency and on the indices converted into US $ 
\vith sovereign returns as the independent variable and the index returns as 
the dependent varia ble. The regression also allows the co-efficient to be 
non-zero. The results are tabulated on page 16. 
y a+bX +~ 
y the dependen~' variable, index returns, 1S assumed to have a linear 
relationship \yith the X variable 
a the intercept 
b the co-efficient or gradient of the independent variable 
X - the independen t variable, namely sovereign index returns, is assumed to 
be nonstochasttc in nature whose variables are fn;:ed 
~ - the error term. "\ssumptions related to the error term are: 
the error term llas zero expected value and has constant variance for all 
observations, tlle random variable are statistically independent of each 
other, and the error term is normally distributed. 
13 AN IMF study of financial market developments in Malaysia. Indonesia. Philippines. Thailand and 
South support the presence of contagion effects. The study found very high correlations between 
sovereign spreads across th~ five countries. This indicated that markets felt that the probability of 
private debt default increas~d dramatically in these countries. and nervousness about one market was 
transmitted readily. As a c1)flsequence, global investors demanded higher risk premiums for all 
countries (Source: www:mls.gov.sglresource/contagion-c.html, Economic Issues: Contagion During 











The R squared column gives the R squared statistic associated with 
regressions. It is a measure of how well the independent variable explains 
the dependent variable. The closer the R squared is to one the better the 
movement in index rdurns are explained by sovereign bond returns. 
The gradient (the co-efficient of the independent variable) is a measure of 
sensitivity of the dependent on the independent variable. 
The last statistic disp layed is the p-value. This is the level of significance that 
is associated with thf~ gradient. The lower the p-value the more significant 
the independent variable. 
The other terms in rhe regression are not disclosed (the intercept and the 
error term) as they are included in the model to capture other explanatory 
variables not included in the list of independent variables and are, thus, not 
important for the purposes of this research. The table does not include 
results from the regressions of the Argentinean and Chinas' Index in US 
Dollars, as they were not significantly different from the Index in local 
currency results. This is because the local currency of these countries was 
pegged to the US De lIar. 
I n terms of R squared, the countries that are most affected by the sovereign 
risk are Argentina, Brazil, :I\1exico and Venezuela (all South American 
countries). Argentina had a relatively high R squared for all the periods. 
Both Brazil and Venezuela demonstrated a significant increase in the R 
squared for the during crisis period when compared to the pre-crisis period. 
A review of the results reveals that the gradient is positive for all the sample 
members (albeit China A and China B whose gradient is not statistically 
sigruficant) and time periods. This is in line with our expectations because as 
sovereign risk of a country decreases (increases) the sovereign bond 
return increases (decreases) and investment in that country's equity 
would increase (decrease) thus giving us a positive relationship 
between the sovereign index and equity index. 
There seems to be a significant shift from one time period to the next. The 
average R squared fl)r index in local currency changes from 0.114 for the 
pre-crisis period to (;,245 for during the crisis period and to 0.145 after the 
crisis. The general trend with the sample members is similar to the trend for 
averages. The R sejuared increases from the pre-crisis levels and then 
decreasing after the crisis but not to its original levels. This means that 
sovereign risk is an important determinant of stock market 











influence on stock markets than it did prior to the crisis. This is also 
evident from reviewing the changes in the average gradient value. 
The average R squared for index in US Dollars also follows a similar trend. 
However for most of the countries the R squared is higher than the local 
currency index indicating that sovereign risk is an important factor that 
international investors take into consideration when investing in emerging 
markets. 
If sovereign risk increases (sovereign bond returns decrease) there 
should be a withdrawal of funds by international investors and this 
would affect the equity and currency returns negatively. 
A review of the gndient indicates that equity returns are now more 
sensitive to sovereign risk. Again index returns in US Dollars are more 
sensitive to sovereign risk then local index returns. This implies that 
sovereign risk as ::alculated here has become a better measure of 
international investor sentiment than it was prior to the crisis. The average 
gradient increases (albeit marginally) after the crisis unlike the R squared. 
The analysis above rlUst be taken with caution, as there are equity markets 
where sovereign risk plays an insignificant role. TIns means that for these 
countries, international investors do not play an important role in the equity 
market (The alternative conclusion of sovereign risk not being an adequate 
measure of international investor sentiment was discarded from the outset). 
Despite this, in the next chapter we attempt to group equity markets and 
briefly compare the results with the groupings based on the sovereign bond 
markets. 
In an interesting pnallel to the results in this Chapter, Block & Vaaler 
(2001) concluded th:1.t sovereign spreads on emerging market debt increase 
after an election (A period of time that is known to bring uncertainty to 
inyestors). The change in the nature of sovereign spreads from the pre-
election to post-election was also marginal and also not to the level of 











I TABLE 5.1: REGRESSION OF SOVEREIGN RETURNS ONTO EQUITY RETURNS 
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CHAPTER 6: CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapters we had established the sovereign risk is an 
important determinant of equity returns in some emerging markets. \Ve had 
also assumed that 'lOvereign risk is a proxy for international investor 
sentiment towards emerging market equity. In this chapter we try and group 
international investor sentiment towards emerging market equity (i.e. 
sovereign risk) as well as the emerging stock markets (i.e. equity indices) 
based on similarity. 
Cluster analysis has been used relatively frequendy in research on stock 
market linkages (Cheung & Ho, 1991 and Panton, Lessig & Joy, 1976, for 
example) Prior research however has used Cluster analysis to graphically 
display a correlation table (The similarity of two markets was measured by 
some form of correlation statistic in the above-mentioned research). This 
research uses K-mtans clustering in identifying groupings of emerging 
markets. This meth(ld of clustering is different from the more commonly 
used, Hierarchical clustering (more specifically joining/ tree clustering). 
Panton, Lessig & Joy (1976) explain Hierarchical clustering as follows: 
Asswne there are r:. entities, each of which is described in terms of p 
variables. In order to specifY the similarity structure of the entities, it is 
necessary to comp,lre these entities on the basis of all p variables 
simultaneously. Hierarchical clustering begins by treating each of the n 
entities as a separate cluster. Using a defmed method of similarity (such as 
correlation in Panton, Lessig and Joy (1976) or Euclidean distance as in the 
case of this research), a search is made to find two clusters (individual 
entities at this stage) which are most similar. When found, these two clusters 
are merged and treated as one large cluster. Thus there are now n-1 clusters 
or groups. Again a st~arch is made to fmd which two of the n-1 clusters are 
the most similar. These two clusters merge producing a total of n-2 clusters. 
This iterative proces~, is continually repeated either until a desired number of 
clusters have been discovered or until all entities have been merged into one 
group. Appendi.x D illustrates how this process works. 
K-means cluster analysis requires the pre-specification of the number of 
cluster groups. The exercise then progresses with finding elements for each 
cluster such that there is minimum within cluster distances as well as 
maximum between cluster distances. The aim of the algorithm is to 
maximise variability between clusters and minimise variability within 
clusters. In terms of traditional research, this exercise can be related to 











as much as possible to rejecting the formulated Null Hypothesis (i.e. All the 
stock markets are similar and! or no clustering of emerging markets occurs). 
The K-means cluster analysis is preferred to the Joining clustering method 
since it allows for greater and easier comparability between Index results and 
Sovereign bonds results. The continent cumulative returns earlier indicate 
that it would be appropriate to assume that four different clusters exist, one 
for each continent. 
The K-means cluster analysis was executed on three different pre-specified 
time periods, namely, pre-crisis, during crisis and post crisis. The sample 
sizes for these tests are the same as that in the previous Chapter, namely 
131, 81 and 144 (per time series) respectively. The tests were done on both 
the sovereign risk dala as well as on the index in US $ data. All indices were 
converted to US $ for ease of comparability and to theoretically remove any 
differences caused by inflation. The results are shown below. 
The tables show the members of each cluster for both the tests on the index 
data as well as on the sovereign index data. The numbers below each 
country is the distance of that country from the centre of that cluster. With 
each period there if another table that gives the distances between the 
respective cluster groups. The numbers below the diagonal are the distances 
for the equity index clusters whereas the numbers above the diagonal are the 
distances for the cluscers from the sovereign index tests. 
PRE-CRISIS 
T.\BLE 6.1.1: CLUSTEtt I\fEMBERS AND WTfHIN GROCP DISTANCES 
i CLUSTER I INDEXINUS$ SOVEREIGN INDEX 
1 i Russia Russia, Pana111a 
0 11.372, 11.372 
I 2 J\rgentina, Brazil, China A, Peru, Venezuela 
Venezuelr 
i 15.092, 2:U48, 19.824, 17.509 4'(l24, 4J)24 . 
3 China B, \fexico, Panama, Poland .Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, i 
i Poland 
15.274,6.%9,5.857,12.867 3.523,4.720, 1OA48, 10.398, 13.873 
i 4 • Peru, Philtppines, S.A., S Korea China, Philippines, S.A , S Korea 











TABLE 6.1.2: CLUSTEll DIS'L\NCES 
CLUSTER 1 2 
1 () 33.767 
2 74.336 0 
3 10 Hl82 35.908 
4 12').423 64.143 
;\verage distance for equity index clusters: 72.634 






The equity index clmters do not match the sovereign index clusters exactly. 
This is because there are a far greater variety of factors that would influence 
a stock market when compared to the sovereign bond market. Sovereign 
risk is one of the fact:)rs that can influence the stock market but it is not the 
only one. This is reiterated by the fact that, on average, the sovereign index 
clusters were closer to each other when compared to the equity index 
clusters for all the bme periods. There is nonetheless a visible degree of 
similarity between the equity index clusters and the sovereign index clusters. 
It is evident from~he cluster groupings above that the geographical 
location of a country plays an important role in the composition of the 
clusters. 75% of the members of Cluster 2 (in equity index clusters) are 
from South America, whereas 80% and 75% of the members of sovereign 
index cluster groups 3 and 4 respectively are from the same continent as 
well. 
Cluster 1, composed solely of Russia, in equity index clusters is the most 
distant group from the others. Russia has been experiencing its unique 
growth and development prior to the crisis. South Africa (S.A.) seems to 
have strong Asian in t1uence as it is similar to China, Philippines and South 
Korea for the purposes of sovereign risk ratings; however, the S.A. stock 












'L\BLE 6.2.1: CLUSTE1~ MEI\fBl,:RS AND WITI-lIN GROUP DISTANCES 
CLUSTER INDEXINUS$ SOVEREIGN INDEX 
1 ;\rgentina, Brazil, China A, Mexico, Argentina, Panama, Peru, 
Peru, Poland, S.A. Philippines, S.;\. S Korea 
10.563, '4.937, 29.417, 9.615, 3.264, 2.522, 3.901, 2.004, 2.707, 
13.192, 12.571,8.836 5.869 
2 Panama China, I\lexico, Poland 
0 2JJ76, 3573, 2.766 
3 China B, Russia, Venezuela Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela 
10.119, 13.9, 5.974 3.127, 3Jl35, 3.624 
4 Philippine;, S Korea Russia 
6Jl21, 6.021 0 
T:\BLE 6.2.2: CLLTSTEI~ DISTANCES 
CLUSTER 1 2 3 4 
1 0 7.430 10.818 42.515 
2 8(1.955 0 16.886 48.884 
3 2:,.934 102.906 0 32.411 
4 35.341 111.558 29.105 0 
.\ verage distance for eqUlty index clusters: 63.966 
.\ yerage distance for soY,:reign index clusters: 26.491 
The average distance~; between clusters (hereafter called average inter-cluster 
distance, AICD) ha~ reduced for both equity index clusters as well as 
sovereign index clusters, indicating that the emerging markets followed each 
other more closely during the crisis period. The average sovereign cluster 
distances are less thar half of the average equity cluster distances. 
Russia forms a cluster of its own in the sovereign index analysis because of 
its default on debt. The closest cluster to Russia is the South American 
cluster of Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela. All these countries also suffered 
from the fears of gmernment bond default during the crisis 14. Barr & Sharp 
(2000) quote the Ec( Inomist as estimating the probability of default on the 
Venezuelan bonds 0:] close to 90%. There is a sinlliar pattern for equity 
index clusters. Russi, and Venezuela are part of the same cluster whereas 
Brazil forms part of 6e closest neighbouring cluster. 
l~ The IMF also makes refennce to the Latin American countries as high probability default countries 












TABLE 6.3.1: CLUSTEK MEMBERS [\ND WITHIN GROUP DISTANCES 
CLUSTER INDEX IN US $ SOVEREIGN INDEX 
1 China B, Russia Russia 
95.165,95.165 0 
2 Brazil, China A, Mexico Brazil, Venezuela 
21.852,21.;08,12.704 3.891,3.891 
3 Argentina, Peru, Poland, S.A. S Argentina, China, Ecuador, 
Korea, Vellezueia Philippines, Poland, S Korea, Panama 
10.411, 1 (j.923, 18.766, 10.162, 13.018, 3.076, 17.546, 7.232, 8.662, 
29.867,24.684 4.146,3.385,7.232 
4 Panama, P1ilippines Mexico, Peru, S.,\. 
6.747,6.747 4.512, 5.005, 3.746 
TABLE 6.3.2: CLUSTER DISTANCES 
CLUSTER 1 2 3 4 
1 0 212.945 249.368 233.527 
2 23.,.564 0 38.211 22.343 
3 27:'-392 45.184 (J 16.754 
4 3D.505 90.397 45.733 0 
. \ verage distance for equ~ ty index clusters: 167 J)22 
.\ verage distance for sovereign index clusters: 128.858 
S.A. is now is more aligned to the emerging markets of South America for 
both the soyereign bond as well as the equity markets. Through out the 
periods under analysi~; Russia has not been consistently aligned to any of the 
other emerging markets. Judging by the AI CD it seems that the emerging 
markets are more dispersed after the crisis than before the crisis. A closer 
analysis will reyeal that the most distant of all the clusters are consistently 
the ones that haye Russia. The average distances from re-performing the 
test, after excluding Russia, is tabulated below. 
·L\BLE 6.3.3: ,\ICD (EXCLUDING RUSSL\) 
PRE DLJRING POST 
Equity Index 47.691 62.590 183.964 











The graph below shows the impact of excluding Russia from testing. It 
graphs the AIen for all the cluster tests over the various crisis states. 
Excluding Russia has a significant impact on all the clusters. It seems that 
Russia is the most unique of all the emerging markets in the sample as the 
AICOs are consistently higher for the tests that include Russia (The post 
crisis AICO (excluding Russia) is likely to be overstated as foreign investors 
bought into Chinese equity after the crisis causing a high growth in the 
China B index). The difference in the sovereign index cluster distances 
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The low sovereign AI CD indicates the extent to which emerging markets 
were treated as similar. The results are in part, consistent with the results 
from the previous chapter. The relationship between sovereign risk and 
equity strengthened after the crisis. This is also evident in the movement of 
the sovereign and equity cluster AICOs after the crisis. The equity AI CD 
increased greatly when compared to the increase in the sovereign AICO. 
Interestingly, the equity AI CD is similar for the during crisis period, 











results from the cluster analysis for the during crisis period excluding Russia 
is included in AppemlLx E. 
There, nonetheless, seems to be no consistent relationship between 
sovereign risk cluster:' and equity clusters. If one assumes that sovereign risk 
is a competent pr< )xy for international investor sentiment, then the 
sm~ereign risk clustes are an indication of the groupings for international 
investor sentiment. The differences that exist between equity clusters and 
sovereign clusters art a result of the impact of other fundamental factors. 
The alternative conc:usion (taking into account the assumptions and results 
from the previous chapter) is that international investor sentiment is an 
irrelevant factor in explaining linkages amongst emerging stock markets. 
This cannot hold true as evidenced by the contagion that took place in 1997 
and 1998 amongst various emerging markets. 
The researcher is thus left with no other choice but to question the initial 
assumption of sovereign risk being an adequate measure towards emerging 
market equity. In the following section we analyse the crisis period in greater 
detail to provide furher insight into the relationship between sovereign risk 
and equity returns. 
THE CRISIS PERIOD ANALYSIS 
It is evident that there has been a structural shift in the relationship between 
sovereign risk and equity returns during the crisis. Here and in AppendLx F, 
we isolate the events that caused the equity and sovereign bond index 
clusters to 'drift away' from their 'equilibrium' classification for the crisis 
period. If the 'groupings' of sovereign risk plays a significant role in the 
'groupings' of the equity markets then the events isolated as being 
responsible should be similar for both equity index and sovereign bond 
index clusters, however, if they are different then an analysis of the events . . 
could lead to an appreciation of why this is the case. 
The F statistic from the analysis of variance performed on each dimension 
(i.e. sample point, 111 this case, a date) is an indication of ho"\v well the 
respective dimension discriminates between clusters. Cluster analysis can be 
interpreted an 'AN OVA in reverse.' A significantly high p-value associated 
with the F statistic on a dimension indicates around that time period, the 
current clusters are likely to be an unreliable indicator of the groupings that 











the 10 highest p_\Talms15. The relevant dates arrived at, from this exercise are 
noted below. From rhese dates, press reports and analysis performed by 
reputable market commentators were searched to identify what events could 
have possibly have le3d to the groupings being considered as unreliable. 
TABLE 6.4: DATES ON WHICH CLUSTERS ARE UNRELIABLE 
I 
EQUITY INDEX SOVEREIGK BOND INDE.xl 
! 
1 August 1997 24 October 1997 
I 
8 August 1997 19 December 1997 
15 August 1997 26 December 1997 
22 August 1997 13 ~larch 1998 
29 A~~lst 1997 20 i\farch 1998 
5 Se]2tember 1997 3 April 1998 
19 September 1997 10 April 1998 
3 October 1997 ~ 7 A]2ril 1998 
I---- ..... --
10 October 1997 ~~A]2ril 1998 
I 17 October 1997 1 rvfav 1998 , 
The equity index clusters presented in the previous section are most likely to 
be inaccurate for the period of August 1997 through to October 1997, 
whereas the sovereign index clusters are most likely to be inaccurate for the 
period late October 1997 through to .May 1998. Interestingly there is no 
overlapping period f(.r the sovereign index dates and equity index dates. 
A summary (based directly from the market commentators) of the events 
surrounding these specific is noted in the Appendi.'{. The default of Russia 
on its debt does not feature in this analysis even though it had a severe 
impact on the global economy. Russia forms a cluster of its own for the 
during crisis period. This implies that the other emerging markets were not 
as severely affected by the default as Russia was. 
The analysis of date:, in the Appendix shows that the events that had the 
greatest impact on the integrity of the equity index clusters were related to 
concerns over a country's currency and the greatest impact on sovereign 
bond clusters wen largely related to macro-economic problems or 
downgrading of sovereign bonds. It is thus apparent that sovereign risk is 
not an adequate measure of international investor sentiment towards 
]5 The first two dates were not include in the exercise. Since all indices were re-indexed to the same 











emerging market equity. The type of eYents that drive the co-movement 
in emerging market equity are distinct from the type of events that drive the 
co-movement in sovereign risk, furthermore, it was earlier noted that 
sovereign risk had a I()w explanatory power in explaining equity returns. 
The dynamics of a c(mntry's exchange rate, however, could provide us with 
greater insight in identifying linkages between emerging markets. In the next 












CHAPTER 7: THE ROLE OF CURRENCY RISK 
So far, \ve have discussed the role of sovereign risk as a measure of 
international investor sentiment. Ho\vever, another risk that has a significant 
role in international investors decision is currency risk. 
Currency risk, for the purposes of this research, is measured by returns 
taking place on the local bond market that can be attributed to expectations 
in currency movements. Using the adjusted methodology16 noted earlier, this 
is the difference between the returns on the local bond market and the 
returns on the sovereign bond market. There were only four countries 
where both the local bond index and sovereign bond index was available. 
The results from the regression of currency risk returns and index returns 
for the pre-crisis (s:lmple size: 131 per time series) and the post crisis 
(sample size: 144 per time series) period are tabulated belo\v. These results 
are reported in a sinlilar manner to the sovereit,111 returns regressions. The 
'during crisis' period is analysed separately. 
TABLE 7.1: REGRESS [ON OF CURRENCY RISK RETl'RNS ONTO INDEX 
RE1'CRNS 
PRE POST 
R~quared Gradient P-vruue R~'1rLxl Gradient P-vruue 
l\IEXICO 0.168 -1.147 1. 165Lr06 0.226 1.133 1. 950E-09 
tvl.EXICO ($) 0.268 -1.5(19 2. 377E· 10 0.252 -1.326 1.6681:"10 
SJ\l-'lUC\ O.en6 (lOSS 0.445 0.103 -0.407 9.253£-05 
S Af7RIC\ ($) 0.013 -3.774 0.252 0.116 -0.489 3. 1391WS 
PI{lllPPINES 0.065 -0.595 o.en3 O.D18 -0.164 0.106 
PHIl n)PINIi'; (~ 0.079 -0.678 n(XH O.CJ31 -0.227 3.445E-02 
POL\ND 0.c08 -O.CI91 0.324 fHl49 -0.511 0.en8 
R)L\ND($) o.C01 -0'()40 0.664 OJl82 -0.8Cl4 5.195E"(l4 
The test in this section was done in a similar manner to the sovereign risk 
section. The R squared for each of the sample members for the currency 
risk is less than the respective R squared from the sovereign risk regressions. 
This means that currency risk is less of an explanatory variable than 
sovereign risk is, for equity market returns. 












The R squared is consistently higher for equity index returns converted into 
US Dollars than it is for index returns in the local currency. There are two 
potential interpretations of tllls result, namely: 
1. This is expect~d as changes in the expectations of currency risk is 
likely to affect international investors more than local investors, or 
2. The reward for currency risk as calculated here is undoubtedly related , , 
to actual currtncy movements. The currency movements are already 
included in the calculations of equity returns in US Dollars. This is 
likely to improve the explanatory power of the independent variable. 
The researcher takes the second view for the purposes of dlls research. 
Gi\Ten the lmv R squared statistics and the small sample size, it is not 
possible to draw any further conclusions. There is, thus, no point pursuing 
cluster analysis for currency risk. Once again we focus on the crisis period to 












THE CRISIS PERIOD 
Graph 4: Cumulative Returns 
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The graph above shows the difference between total cumulative returns for 
the local currency bonds and the sovereign currency bonds from 21 
N ovember 1997 onwards. This result is the total cumulative returns 
rewarded to investors for exclusively bearing currency risk. 
The cumulative returns for all the countries except South Africa display an 
upward trend. This is an indication that they expect the currency to continue 
to depreciate over that time period. For South Africa, on the other hand, the 
currency was expected to remain at some constant level or appreciate after 
the crisis. 
There is a sudden 'spike' around mid-August 1998 onwards. This is because 
of the default by the Russian government on its debt. The impact of this 
default had a severe impact on the S.A. economy given the Central Banks' 
reaction to the crisis 17. 











U sing the expectati< ms theory, it would seem that investors are being 
rewarded for a relati\ely large amount of currency risk. However this is not 
the case. It is not prudent to conclude that an increase in sovereign risk in 
one country has inc-eased the currency risk of another country without, 
initially, considering the impact on the country's sovereign risk. 
An alternative explanation is that the cumulative returns on both sovereign 
bonds and local currency bonds decreased. The decrease in local bonds was 
not as substantial as the sovereign bonds thus gi\ring an upward spike in the 
graph. 
As equity markets halj also become risky around that time, there had been a 
'flight to quality', i.e. assets that offered a better risk/ return profile. There 
would have been an oversupply of sovereign bonds as there were enough 
sellers but not enough buyers (Barr & Sharp, 2000). However, as 
international investo~s attempted to sell off local currency bonds there 
would have been relatively more buyers (as local uwestors experiencing their 
own flight to quality) of local currency bonds. There are two reasons for 
this. 
1. Foreign exchange controls' not permitting a true flight to quality 
assets, and/ or 
2. 'homeward bias' whereby local investors choose to invest in their 
own domicile. 
:Many emerging markets including S.A. have foreign exchange controls that 
restrict the outflow <)f capitaL Calvo & "Mendoza (2000) note that the key 
distUlctive features 0 f global markets from domestic markets are the more 
important roles that information frictions play in the investment decision. 
"The issues of concern to the international investors are thus radically 
different from those 1:hat worry domestic investors, and the costs incurred in 
gaining the same level of expertise at the same level of that typically acquired 
for domestic investm~nt are much higher. IS" 
A combination of the above factors contributed to the 'upward spikes' in 
the graph above. If one assumes that the Russian default had an 
equally cataclysmic impact on all the emerging markets in the 
sample, then the hdght of the spikes can be interpreted as a measure 
of the impact of 'homeward bias' and restrictive foreign exchange 
controls. Alternatively, it is a measure of local investor sentiment to 
the crisis. 











The table below gives the increase in cumulative returns from the default 
date, 17 August 1998, to the local maximum for each of the countries. 
TABLE 7.1.1: LOCAL lYL\XIlVIUlVI DATES FOR CURRENCY CRISIS 
INCREASE LOCAL MAX DATE 
PHILIPPINES 16.889 28 Augus~ 1998 
S.A. 16.092 28 August 1998 
~IEXI(:O 14.581 4 September 1998 
POLAl\jD 12.492 11 SepteIl"lber 1998 
This chapter highlights the difference between foreign investor behaviour 
and local investor behaviour, even though both may (or may not) be acting 
rationally. This difference is identified by focusing on currency risk as 
currency risk is less of a concern for local investors. However, currency risk 
is not adequate proxy to identify linkages between emerging markets. 
Interestingly, Schmukler & Kaminsky (1999) identify that 34% the market 
jitters in the emerging markets in Asia during the crisis were based no sound 
reasons whatsoever. '11any studies of asset pricing have rejected the view 
that new information is the driving force behind asset price movements.' 
In the next chapter we focus on currency movement as opposed currency 












CHAPTER 8: VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES 
The graph below details the difference in the moving volatility19 of the 
average emerging (developed) market index and the average emerging 
(developed) market index translated into US Dollars. The difference is an 
indication of the extent of the volatility that was absorbed by the foreign 
exchange market. It is a graphical display of the impact of capital flows in 
the equity markets on the foreign exchange markets20. Since capital flows are 
largely due to international investors, exchange rate data could possibly be a 
































19 The moving volatility is based on overlapping window periods of 9 weeks. The sample members for 
the emerging market index and developed market index are detailed in Appendix B. 
20 The above statement is made with qualification as many of the emerging country's foreign exchange 











The developed markets seem to have relatively stable exchange rates with 
the difference in moving volatility varying around zero. The emerging 
markets however sh.)W an increase in the difference in moving volatility 
from 1996 onwards. The fIrst major spike occurs with the devaluation of the 
Thai Bhat in July 1997 and the Russian default is the prominent spike in the 
graph. Both these events are associated with large capital outflows from 
emerging markets. 
It thus seems feasible to conduct cluster analysis on the differences in 
moving volatility to establish groupings for the sentiment towards the 
various emerging sto·:k markets. 
The results from this exercise must be interpreted with caution as Central 
Banks have on sen'ral occasions interfered in foreign exchange markets. 
Currencies that are pegged cannot be included in this exercise21 , Currencies 
that are forced to tr:lde within a 'tight' bandwidth (or have a crawling peg) 
are likely to have th • .::1r results misstated22, Most importantly, capital flOWS23 
from one emerging market to another will not be noticed by analysing the 
differences in moving volatility thus defeating the purpose of the exercise. 
For the reasons mentioned above the analysis is done for only the post crisis 
period and the results are included in the following section, 
ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
Kantor (1995, Understanding Capitalism: how economies work, p 159) 
notes that the day-t(,-day currency movements that take place are largely due 
to capital inflows and outflows. Furthermore, the sO\~ereign risk is a better 
explanatory variable for equity returns in US Dollars as opposed to equity 
returns in local curt<.::ncy. It is possible to create emerging market groupings 
(subject to the limitations mentioned above) based on international investor 
sentiment by performing cluster analysis on the mO\rlng volatilities. 
Another method that is used is by performing cluster analysis on equity 
returns less currency returns. If there is a large amount of capital inflow 
(outflow) into a stock market, there should be a positive (negative) impact 
on returns on the equity markets as well as returns on the foreign exchange 
It is common knowledge that the SARB openly announced that would defend the currency during the 
crisis. Other countries also admitted to defending the currency. but at later stage. 
22 Appendix G gives detail;. of the sample members exchange rate/ monetary policy for year ended 
1997 onwards. 
23 Appendix H gives the re;.ults from correlation tests based on macro-economic data such as the 
financial account and the c'Jrrent account. The limitations of using macro-economic data is discussed in 















markets. This will aHow identification of any form of herding behaviour 
(rational or irrational) by international investors. The pitfall with such an 
analysis is that the groupings will also include the impact of fundamental 
factors (e.g. external events such as economic shocks to a common trading 
partner) and local investor sentiment on equity. The results from the test 
and the moving volatility test for the post crisis period are tabulated below. 
TABLE 8.1.1: CLUSTEt :MEMBERS FOR MOVING VOL\TILl1Y ~\ND EQUITY 
LESS CURRENCY 
------,.-
CLUSTER MOVING VOLATILITY EQUITY LESS CURRENCY 
1 Venezuela S Korea 
0 10 
2 Rus~ia Czech, Poland 
0 1.869, 1.869 
3 Brazil, Mexico Russia 
2.82+, 2.824 0 
4 Peru, Czech, Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
Thailand, S.A, Poland, S Korea S.i\., Thailand, Venezucla 
I 
2.31,)' O.73~, 0.618, 1.095, 1.289, 13.420, 3.11(2, 2.183, 3.133,2.759, : 
3.78 l, U.8!b 3.181), 3.68.1 i 
T\Bl.E 8.1.2: CLUSTLR DISTANCES 
6.772 
17.447 o 
The first column in Table 8.1.1 gives the results from the cluster analysis on 
the difference in moving volatility data whereas the second column gives the 
results from the Index returns less the currency returns. The distances below 
the diagonal in Tabl!; 8.1.2 relate to the moving volatility clusters and those 
above the diagonal relate to the index less currency returns clusters. 
Once again, geographical location plays an important role in the country 
groupings. The results are not alike because of the m()\Ting volatility's 
inability to distingui~;h between capital inflows and outflows and the impact 











ASSESSING LOCAL INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
As noted in the prtvious chapter, bonds become a safe haven for local 
investors during peri)ds of uncertainty in emerging markets. By comparing 
the differences in ret urns for equity markets and the bond markets for the 
various emerging markets, it will be possible to assess the sentiment of local 
and international inv,::stors. For comparative purposes the cluster results for 
equity returns has als:) been included. 
TABLE 8.2.1: CLUSTER MEl\tBERS FOR EQUITY LL:SS BOND RETCR.NS 
EQUITY LESS BOND 
RETURNS ESTER I 






0 I 2.059,2.059 
I 2 Czech, Poland, S.t\. I Czech, Poland 
i 
2.251,2.237,2.416 : 1.815, 1.815 i 
3 Phili22incs, Thailand Philippines, Thailand I 
2.324, 2.324 2.185,2.185 I 
T~\BLE 8.2.2: CLUSTI.R DISTANCES 
In this test we havt· restricted the cluster number to three given the small 
sample size. The 'equity less currency' results focus on the behaviour of 
international invest( Irs. International investors are likely to take their funds 
in or out of the country depending on how their assessments of the riskiness 
of that country. Th;: 'equity less bonds' results focus on local investors, as 
they are more likely to move funds in or out of the bond market depending 
on their outlook of the economy. As can be seen, the geographical location 
plays a distinct role :n tlle composition of the clusters. 
Interestingly, in predous tests SA has not been associated to the European 
emerging markets. Previous tests indicate that SA was regarded as similar to 
the emerging markets of Asia or South America (based on both fundamental 
and/ or by international investors). The results indicate that local investors 











In this Chapter we used currency data in identifying how international 
investors group emerging markets. While the results were positive, it does 
not solely capture international investor sentiment. In the following chapter 











CH.L~.PTER 9: V AR AND EQUITY RISK 
In this chapter we fo:us on equity risk. This is the risk that investors in the 
stock market assess it to be after taking into consideration all the relevant 
factors. Value at Risk (VaR) measures, in a single number, the total market 
risk a portfolio is exp' )sed to. It is aimed at establishing, with a given amount 
of certainty, the maximum loss a portfolio will suffer over a specified period 
of time. 
If one assumes (as has been in this research) that the equity index of a 
country is an adequate representation of all the equity listed on that stock 
exchange then, performing VaR tests on that index will give an indication of 
the equity risk of that country at a specific point in time. 
In this chapter, the r • .::searcher calculated the 95% weekly VaR based on the 
annual volatility2-t of each of the stock exchanges. The calculation is done on 
the basis of an initial investment of US $ 100. To illustrate, if Argentina had 
a VaR of 9.46% on 24 JYIarch 1995, this means that there is a 95~/0 certainty 
that the maximum If )SS over the course of the following week will be no 
more than US $ 9.4(,. The research only uses index in US $ so as to make 
the equity risk comp3rable amongst the different sample members. 
The 'moving' VaR is calculated as follows: 
The earliest data point is dropped and the latest data point Jotns the 
'sample'. This algorithm starts once there is sufficient data to calculate a VaR 
and ends with the last data point. 
The above process rt.~sults in a time series that tndicates how the equity risk 
of a country changes over time. 
Graph 9.1 shows the 'moving' VaR for all the Asian emerging markets 
within the sample. Graph 9.2 shows the 'moving' VaR for all the other 
(Latin, European and South Africa) emerging markets within the sample. 
The graphs indicate that the impact of the two distinct crisis. The equity risk 
for the Asian emerging markets s tarts increasing from around .i\lIay 1997, 
close to the start of l:he crisis as defined in this research. The equity risk for 
the non-Asian markets increases (taking into account the contagion from 
the Asian crisis) from around July 1998, close to the date of default of the 
Russian government on its debt. 
2,) The annual volatility is calculated by using the standard deviation of 52 consecutive data points. The 
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The VaR for the Asian markets do not return to the lows that they had 
experienced before the crisis indicating that they have not yet fully recovered 
from the crisis or there has been a change in the risk profile of the Asian 
markets. The VaR for the non-Asian markets, however, in most cases, are 
close (and in most cases below) to their pre-crisis levels. This is largely 
because of the higher than expected VaR during the start of the time series. 
The non-Asian markets consist mainly of Latin American markets, which 
had suffered from a banking crisis and contagion in 1994/5. As can be seen 
South Africa was more affected by the Russian default crisis than it was by 
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- South Alrie. 
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If the risk of investing in a country increases then one would expect the 
sovereign risk (assuming sovereign risk is an adequate indicator of equity 
risk) to increase as well as the equity risk 01 aR). This implies one would 
expect to see a negative relationship (correlation) between the sovereign 
bond indices and the VaR of a country. The table below gives the 
correlation for the sovereign risk index and the VaR for all the sample 
member countries over the major time periods as well as over the entire 
sample period. A graph based on the table has been included below the table 
for ease of reference. 
The movement in correlation over the various time periods is significant and 
often against what we had initially expected. If we assume that the crisis 
period is associated with an increase in sovereign risk as well as equity risk 
then one possible explanation for these drastic movements in the correlation 
is the structural shifts in investors' assessment of equity risk relative to 
sovereign risk25 . 
2S This conclusion is based on the fact that the methodology used to calculate VaR has not changed to 











TABLE 9.1: CORRELATION OF SOVEREIGN RISK AND EQUITY 
RISK 
Pre-crisis During Post crisis Overall 
Argentina -0.67 -0.09 -0.55 -0.16 
Brazil -0.97 -0.60 -0.93 -0.38 
China A -0.11 -0.75 -0.72 -0.74 
China B 0.84 0.51 0.29 0.77 
Mexico -0.88 -0.11 -0.63 -0.24 
Peru -0.87 -0.18 -0.76 -0.72 
Philippines -0.89 -0.06 -0.10 0.18 
Poland -0.95 0.79 -0.51 -0.55 
Russia 0.07 -0.98 -0.87 -0.61 
S. Africa -0.60 -0.45 -0.71 0.18 
S. Korea 0.90 -0.49 -0.52 0.25 
Venezuela 0.42 -0.75 -0.92 -0.37 
Only RussIa, Venezuela, South Korea and China had a decrease in 
correlation from pre-crisis to during crisis26 . This implies that the nature of 
the crisis in these omntries did not cause a drastic shift in the manner in 
which investors vie\Y equity risk. For all the other countries, there has been a 
change in the nature of equity risk from pre-crisis to during crisis periods. 
However all post ctlsis correlations (except China B) are negative, which is 
in line with our expectations. This reflects a return to normality. 
The correlation between sovereign risk and equity risk indicates the 
significance of sov,.:reign risk in a country's' equity. A large negative 
correlation implies that the risk is an important determinant of equity risk in 
that country. Since ~;overeign risk is calculated from instruments traded by 
international investors, it follows that a large negative correlation between 
equity risk and sovereign risk implies that sovereign risk is a good proxy for 
international investor sentiment for those countries. 
26 The Latin American countries had experienced their own crisis in the earlier part of the pre-crisis 
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"""*""" V en ezu al a 
Judging by the correlations over the entire period, Peru, Poland, Russia, 
Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina27 are countries whereby one can 
assess international investor sentiment by following sovereign risk. In 
Chapter 5 we had concluded that equity is more sensitive to sovereign risk 
after the crisis than before the crisis. It would thus not be appropriate to re-
perform cluster tests on the smaller sample over the current sample period 
used in this research but rather to focus on updating the sovereign risk data 
and thereafter performing cluster tests. 












CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
This research is based on the assumption that investor sentiment is the 
dominant factor in explaining linkages that may exist between emerging 
markets. Thus finding a proxy for international investors sentiment towards 
emerging market equity is a key concern that this research attempts to 
address. 
The obvious choice for such a proxy, sovereign risk, cannot satisfactorily 
explain the co-movement of emerging market indices caused by contagion 
or herding behaviour. It was established that sovereign risk has a negative 
relationship with equity as expected. Sovereign risk has more of an influence 
on equity than it did before the crisis. 
The sovereign bond clusters were largely affected by macro-economic news 
or sovereign bond downgrades. Equity index clusters were largely affected 
by concerns over the currency. However if sovereign risk and equity risk 
have a strong relationship then sovereign risk can be an adequate proxy for 
international investor sentiment. 
Currency risk has less explanatory power than sovereign risk in explaining 
linkages between emerging markets. Using the concept of currency risk, 
however, the research does provide some insight into the extent of adversity 
experienced by some emerging markets during the emerging market crisis of 
1997/8. 
Currency movements provide a better indication of how international 
investors view emerging markets. The problem with using currency 
movements is the potential interference of Central Banks as well as the fact 
that countries that have pegged currencies cannot be included in any form 
of testing. The impact of local investor sentiment on equity markets can be 
assessed by examining the relationship between equity and bonds. 
The day-to day currency movements that take place are largely due to capital 
inflows and outflows. This research identifies groupings of emerging 
markets based on large capital inflows and outflows by performing cluster 
analysis on equity returns less currency returns (as well as currency moving 
volatilities). This identifies linkages that are partly caused by international 
. . 
illvestor sentJ..ment. 
There are indicatiocs that the local investors of SA behave similarly to the 
local investors in the emerging markets of Europe. This is an area of further 











exchange markets can be interpreted as the impact of international investor 
sentiment. 
There are also indications that there has been a shift in the way investors 
view equity risk relative to sovereign risk. Another area of research is the 
relationship between sovereign credit ratings and equity returns. Sovereign 
credit ratings may be a better proxy for international investor sentiment 
when compared to sovereign bond indices. The relationship between 
sovereign risk and equity risk deserves further attention. Other pitfalls that 
can be addressed in future research is the pre-defmition of the crisis states in 
this research or the quality of data used can be improved on. 
No measure that solely and accurately captures international investor 
sentiment for all the emerging markets could be found. It was nonetheless 
established that markets that are in close geographical proximity to each 
other, are likely to be more linked due to both, fundamental factors as well 
as investor sentiment. In the context of international portfolio 
diversification, it is not advisable to invest in countries that are in close 
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Appendix A: CORRELATION TABLE FOR EMERGING MARKET INDICES IN US DOLLARS 
C hina A C hina B Indonesia Malaysia Philippines IN. Zealand Thailand Argentin, Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela S Afric, Hungary Poland Russia 
China A 1.0C 0.33 ·O.7C -0.63 -0.8C 0.91 -0.84 0.00 0.55 -0.73 -0. 6 ~ 0.7/ 0.05 -0.65 0.5E 0. 11 0.56 
China E 0.33 1.0C 0.12 0.13 -0.02 0.29 -0.04 0.1 9 0.24 0.11 -O.O? 0.22 O.Y) O.H 0.02 0.0/ 0.4C 
Indonesi, -O.7C 0. 12 1.0C 0.96 0.95 -0.78 0. 82 0.34 -0.21 0.88 0.63 -O.4E 0.26 0.82 -0.4C 0.26 -0. 25 
Malaysia -0.b3 0.13 0.9£ 1.00 0.94 -0.7.3 0.84 0.22 -0.25 0.86 O.4S -0.42 0.1 5 o.r -0.4 / 0.28 -O . .3C 
Philippines -0.8C -0.02 0.95 0.94 1.0C -0. 85 0.8 / 0.23 -0.35 0.86 0.63 -0.58 0. 1l O.7S -0.48 0.23 -0.42 
New Zealand 0.9 1 0.29 -0.78 -0.73 -0.85 1.0C -0.83 -0.04 0.50 -0.73 -0.65 0.7 0.08 -0.63 0.55 -0.02 0.5/ 
Thailand -0.84 -0.04 0.82 0.84 O.~ -0.83 I.QC -0.13 -0.60 0. 87 O. ,!£ -0.6 -0. 16 0.74 -0.7£ -0.09 -0.5 8 
Argentino O.OC 0.19 0.34 0. 22 0.23 -0.04 -0.13 1.0C 0.74 0.2/ 0. 5~ 0 . .38 0.83 0.46 0.6E 0.72 0 . 6~ 
Brazi 0.55 0.24 -0.21 -0.25 -0.35 0.50 -0.60 0.74 1.0C -0.2 1 0.05 0.77 0.65 -0.02 0.8 0.64 0.8 / 
Chile -0.7:\ 0.11 0.88 0.86 0.8E -0.73 0.8 / 0.2/ -0.21 1.00 0.67 -0.41 0.22 0.8/ -0 . 4~ 0. 15 -0.1 8 
Colombi -0.69 -0.02 0.63 0.49 0.63 -0.65 0.46 0. 54 0.05 0.67 1.00 -0.39 0.52 0.65 0.0 1 0.21 O.OS 
Mexico 0.7/ 0.22 -0.46 -0.42 -0.58 0.77 -0.67 0.3 8 0.7/ -0.41 -0 . .3 9 1.00 0.32 -0.27 0.71 0.3 8 O.7E 
Venezuel. 0.05 0.39 0. 26 0. 15 0.11 0.08 -0 .16 0.83 0.65 0.22 0.52 0.32 1.0C 0. 36 0.55 0.5 1 0.75 
S AJric, -0.65 O.l-t 0.82 0.79 O.7S -0.63 0.74 0.46 -0.02 0.87 0.65 -0.27 0.3£ 1.0C -0 .2~ 0.34 -0.05 
Hungary 0.56 0.02 -0.40 -0.4/ -0.48 0.55 -0.76 0.66 0.8/ -0.44 0.0 1 0.71 0.55 -0.24 1.0C 0.5 8 O.7S 
Poland 0. 11 0.0/ 0. 26 0.28 0.23 -0.02 -0 .09 0.72 0.64 0.1 5 0.21 0.38 0.51 0.34 0.5 8 1. 0C 0.45 
Russia 0.)6 O.4C -0.25 -0.3C -0.42 0.5/ -0.58 0.64 0.8/ -0.1 8 0.09 0.76 0.75 -0.05 O.7S 0.45 1.0C 
S. Kore -0.56 -0.05 0.68 0.74 0.6/ -0.5 / 0.84 -0.1 8 -0.49 0.75 0.18 -0.32 -0.23 0.61 -0.6£ -0.13 -0.4 / 
-
The above correlations are based on weekly data from January 1995 to April 2001. A compariso n of the correlaLions for pre-
crisis, during crisis and POSt crisis (not included in this research) do not reflect any definite relationships, and thus tests using 





























Appendix B: SAMPLE MEMBER COUNTRIES AND INDICES USED 
COUNTRY INDEX STOCK STOCK 
SELECTION EXCHANGE 
EMERGING MARKET INDICES 
A!:gmili~ Men'al Stock selected on the Buenos .\ires 
basis of number of 
transactions and volume 
Brazil Bovespa Weighting by trade S,lO P,llIlo 
volume. 
Chik IPSA 400f the highest average Santidgo 
annual trading \'olume 
over the past yea r. 
China ~ Shanghai A Capitalization-weighted, Shangh,li 
restricted to loca l 
IIl\'esto rs. 
~Jli!:!~ ~ Shangh'li B Clpit,llization-weighted, Shanglui 
available fo r inves tment 
by foreign in vestors. 
Priced in US $ 
Indonesi! J<lkarta Composite Modified capitdliZ<ltion- Jakarta 
weighted index off all 
listed stock 
MalaLS~ Ku ala Lumpur . Broad-based Kuala Lum pu r 
Com posite Cd piraliz<ltion- weigh ted 
index of 100 stocks. 
PhiIiQ,pjnes PSE-Composite Cap i tal izat io n-weigh ted Philippine SE. 
New Z,eala 'lct NZSE40 Modified market cap. 
weighted of 40 largest & )Je,,' Zealand 
most liquid stock. 
Thailand Bangkok SET Capitalization-weighted SF of Thailand 
index off all listed stock 
Colomb~ Bog-Bolsa 20 of the volume based BogoL! 
companies selected . 
Mexico Mexican Bols,l Capitalization-weighted Mexican 
Venezuela General Index Capitalization-weighted C,lr,lCas 
of 15 most liquid stock 
South Africa Johannesburg All Share Capitalization-weighted Johannesburg 
of all listed stock 
Hun&1 rx Budapest stock Capitalization-"'eighted Budapest 
exch,lOge index 
Poland WIG 20 Capitalization-weighted \'V,lrsaw 
index of 20 stock 
RUS5~ ASP Gener,11 Composite index of all Russian 
Russian stock 
South Korea KOSP12 Capitalization-" 'eighted Korea 
index of 200 stock. 
Czechoslovakia PX-50 C,lpit ,llization-"'eighted Pr,lglie 
index of 50 stock. 
Ecuador BVG Ind ex Tot,d return index. Bols,1 deValores de 
revised bi-annually GlIa\'Jquil 
Panama Panama Stock Exchange No further info P,lnanH 
General available . 
Peru Peru Linu General Value weighted index. Lin1<l 
Index B,lsed on largest and 











DEVELOPED MARKET INDICES 
US b. NYSE Composite C'lpit 'llization-'.wighted Ne"'" York 
of all listed stock 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 C,lpit,lli z<1t ion-weighted Londo n 
of the 100 highest 
C<lpit<ll ized srock 
Franc~ CAC-40 C lpitalization-weighted Paris bourse 
of 40 srock 
German.}: HDAX 100 T ot,ll retu rn index of Frank furt 
100 highest ca pitalized 
srock 
.Lieil!! Nikkei 225 A \"Crage Price-weighted index of Tokyo 
225 top-r<1ted Japanese 
stock 
Can<1ci<! TSE 100 Capitalization-","eighted Toronto 
of 100 highest 
c,lpita lized srock 
Ita ly MIB 30 Capitalization-","eighted MiLlI1 
of 30 stock 
Austr<1lid Australian All Capiraliz,nion- .... "eighred AustrJli,ln 
Ordinaries of the 500 largest 
com p,lI1ies 
The underlined countries were used in the construction of the emerging 
market or developed market index, those in bold form part of the core 











Appendix C: EXAMPLE OF CALCULATION OF SOVEREIGN RISK: 
S.A. 
To calculate the sovereign credit spread for South Africa, a simple contrast 
between the yield on a rand-denominated bond issued by the Republic of 
South Africa and a US dollar-denominated bond issued by the US Treasury 
will not be helpful. In particular, part of the higher yield that investors 
receive on rand-denominated bonds relative to US Treasury bonds is related 
to expectations of currency performance over the lifetime of the bonds in 
question. That is, an investor who prefers a rand-based US Treasury bond 
will only do so if he is compensated, firstly, for relatively higher credit risk of 
the South African government relative to the US government, and secondly, 
for the likelihood that the rand will lose ground against the dollar over the 
term of the bond. 
The spread between a rand-based RSA bond and a dollar-based USA bond 
can be split into two (admittedly related) components: the currency risk and 
the credit risk. The currency risk is merely the level of compensation that 
investors demand for holding rand- rather than dollar-denominated bonds 
of the same tenure, that is, investor expectations of rand depreciation 
against the dollar over the period in question. 
Spread = Currency (or Exchange Rate) Risk + Sovereign (or Credit) Risk 
Thus, by way of example, consider the following 3 instruments: 
1. 10 year RSA government bond in Johannesburg, yielding 15% in 
Rand. 
2. 10 year RSA government bond trading in New York (paying a dollar 
coupon) redeemable in dollars, yielding 8%. 
3. 10 year US government bond in New York, yielding 6%. 
a) We may first calculate the Currency or Exchange Rate Risk. This is 
the premium paid for a Rand denominated rather than a dollar 
denomillated bond (same default (or sovereign) risk). 
It is the Risk adjusted assessment of the depreciation of the Rand/ $ 
exchange rate for the tenure of the bond (in this case 10 years). 
Exchange Rate Risk = 1.- 2. 
In this example, Exchange Rate Risk = 15% - 8% = 7%, that is, the Rand is 











b) We may then calculJte the Sovereign Risk. This is the Risk premium 
the RSA government must pay above the US government for 
borrowing money (in dollars). Assuming the US Government has no 
default risk this is a measure of the RSA government default risk. 
(SA) Sovereign Risk = 2. - 3. 
In this example, (SA) Sovereign Risk = 8% - 6% = 2%. 
Also, the total Spread which equals 
(1. - 3.) = 15% - 6% = 9% 
and this must equal the sum of currency risk and sovereign risk (2% + 7%). 
Source: Barr & Sharp (2000), unpublished paper, first draft, Measuring 












Appendix D: ILLUSTRATION ON HOW HIERARCHICAL ANALYSIS 
WORKS 
Assume that the similarity structure of five objects, A, B, C, D and E is to 
be examined using hierarchical cluster analysis. Let a cluster (or similarity 
grouping) he identified by parentheses that enclose the identification of the 
entities within the cluster. The aggregation of the five entities into clusters 
could proceed in the following fashion: 
Iteration 1: (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Iteration 2: (A, D) (B) (C) (E) 
Iteration 3: (A, D) (B, E) (C) 
Iteration 4: (A, D) (B, E, C) 
Iteration 5: (A, D, B, E, C) 
It can be seen that A and D are the most similar pair of objects followed by 
Band E. C is the most similar to the cluster (B, E) than it is to the (A, D) 
cluster. Finally, the aggregation process forces (A, D) and (B, E, C) to 
merge. By observing the pattern of mergers, the level of association at which 
groups merge, and the identity of the resulting clusters, the investigator 
gains insight into the similarity structure of his data. 
Source: Panton, Lessig & Joy (1976), Co-movement of international equity 
markets: A taxonomic approach, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 











Appendix E: CLUSTER ANALYSIS RESVL TS 
The results are based on cluster analysis tests Jane on the during crisis 
period after excluding Russia. 
T ABLE: CLUSTER MEMBERS AND WITHIN GROUP DISTANCES 
CLUSTER INDEX IN US $ SOVEREIGN INDEX 
1 Argentim, Brazil, Chim B, Peru, Argentina, Panamcl, Peru, Philippines, 
S.A. , VenezuelJ S.A. 
4.740,7.115,8.535,5.570,8.307, 2.549,2.058,3.592,2.461,2.468 
11.393 
2 China A, Mexico, Poland China, Mexico, PolJnd 
15.8.32, 12.859, 6.392 2.087,3.533,2.720 
3 Philippines , S Korea Brazil , Venezuela 
6.021,6.021 3.044, 3.044 
4 Panama S Korea 
0 ° 
T ABLE: CLUSTER DISTANCES 
CLUSTER 1 2 3 4 
1 0 6.884 9.879 7.036 
2 28.806 ° 16.011 11.654 3 24.053 49.167 0 11.681 
4 94.981 66.977 111.558 0 
Average distance {or equity index clusters: 62 .590 











Appendix F: CRISIS DATE ANALYSIS 
EQUITY INDEX DATES 
The events in August had a severe impact on most emerging markets. The 
Singapore dollar starts declining and the Malaysian Ringgit hits a 38-month 
low in the last week of July. This starts a currency meltdown over Asia. 
On the 5 August, Thailand adopts tough economic measures proposed hy 
the IMF in return for a $17 billion loan from international and Asian 
nations. The Thai government suspends 48 financing firms. The Indonesian 
Rupiah comes under severe pressure and the system of managing the 
exchange rate through the use of a band is abolished, thus allowing the 
currency to trade freely. The Indonesian central bank raises interest rates in 
response to the drastic drop in the Rupiah. 
The Hong Kong Dollar comes under speculative attack on 15 August and 
overnight interest rates are up 150 basis points to 8%. The stock markets are 
sharply lower. The IMF approves a further $3.9 billion credit for Thailand 
on 20 August. 
The Philippine Peso comes under severe pressure on 4 September and 
drops to a record low against the US Dollar. The reserve bank intervenes 
and helps the Peso recover. 
Malaysia threatens to ban (or implement tighter controls on) foreign 
exchange trading on 1 October and the currency falls more than four 
percent in the space of two hours. The Indonesian currency is also affected 
negatively. 
On 14 October, Vietnam doubles the trading range for their Dong currency 
to 10% either side of the official trading rate. The Taiwan Dollar is devalued 
as well. On 17 October, Malaysia presents a belt-tightening budget to try to 
stop the economy from sliding into recession. 
All the events noted above relate to the Asian (currency) crisis while only 
four of the thirteen sample members (two relate to China which had a 
pegged currency during the crisis) llsed in the cluster analysis relate to Asia. 
Given the geographical mixture of results from the previolls chapter for the 
during crisis state one can conclude that there was a significant amount of 












SOVEREIGN INDEX DATES 
By 24 October the Hong Kong stock market had shed a quarter of its value 
in the space of four days. The fall was more severe than the 1987 crash. This 
was based on concerns of interest rate hikes and pressure on the Hong 
Kong Dollar. These concerns were founded on the recent devaluation of the 
Taiwanese Dollar, which could not keep up with the link with the US 
Dollar. 
In the week preceding 19 December, the IMF announced the restarting $10 
billion loan to Russia to provide much-needed financial assistance for the 
government amid persistent market tension. The South Korean currency 
recovers by 10% on the prospects of further funding from the IMF. All 
other South East Asian currencies were sharply lower. 
On 16 December the US announces that it will keep interest rates 
unchanged due to lower inflation figures and the worsening of the crisis in 
Asia. Japan, on the other hand, announces large cuts in personal income 
taxes to rescue the economy. The dollar was sharply lower the following 
day. South Korea elects a new president, Kim Dae-jung, raising concerns by 
some investors that the economy would suffer further. 
A triple-digit figure loss in the US market the day before and a 5% drop in 
Tokyo shares on 19 December affect other Pacific Rim markets negatively. 
Concerns about the state of reform for the South Korean economy 
resurface, one day after the presidential elections. Investors comment that 
the recent collapse of foodstuffs trader Toshoku Ltd, the fourth largest 
bankruptcy in post-war Japan, provides more evidence that debt-ridden 
Japanese banks have tightened lending so severely that the economy is in the 
grip of a credit crunch. 
On 22 December, Moody 's Investor Service downgrades the sovereign 
debt of four Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and 
Thailand), lowering three of them to junk bond status. The rating agency 
attributes this move to concerns about South Korea's short-term foreign 
currency needs and the ability of Indonesia's corporate sector to meet 
foreign debt obligation. 
Key markets are sharply lower on 23 December based on the news of 
downgrading of sovereign debt to junk bond status. South Korea suffers the 
worst. Of the 861 stocks that dropped, 772 hit their daily lower limit. 
Brokers and dealers say the markets slid as confidence in South Korea was 











well as Moody's Investor Services. Kim told local media, "We don't know 
whether we could go bankrupt tomorrow or day after tomorrow. I can't 
sleep since I was briefed about the financial situation." The Finance Ministry 
has estimated short-term debt due to be $30 billion over the next two 
months. 
"The Won's nose-dive was a major factor to ruin the debt market," 
commented a dealer at Daishin Securities. Dealers say the won's volatility 
reminded the debt market of the possibility of debt defaults by South Korea. 
"me exchange rate is saying how dire the maykets feel the circumstances are," an 
international broker commented. 
South Korean stock market falls 6% on 24 December based on concerns of 
the present crisis in Korea leading to a debt moratorium. Bankers in Tokyo 
believe that South Korean financial institutions could default on its debt if 
Korea maintains IMF conditions on restricting liquidity. The IMF, USA and 
12 other nations pledged to speed up $10 billion in bailout money to South 
Korea. U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin commented, "This is a major 
world event and it seemed appropriate for the G7 industrial countries and 
other nations involved to move their aid forward." 
A dispute on 9 March between Indonesia and the IMF about the country's 
commitment to economic reform and delay in disbursement of funds affects 
most Pacific Rim markets. The IMF is concerned about the credibility and 
effectiveness of a currency board, should Indonesia apply one. 
The events of April affected sovereign bonds globally. Pacific Rim equity 
was lower on 30 March as investors lose faith in the Japanese government 
ability to float the market. Economic indicators released on the 31 March 
indicate Korea is heading towards a recession. On 2 April Pacific Rim 
markets suffer as a recently released survey indicate the corporate 
confidence in the Japanese economy is at an all time low. On 3 April Moody 
lowers its rating on Japanese sovereign debt. The US withholds funds 
designated to r~plenish IMF resources. 
On 7 April South Korea decides to delay the issue of its $4 billion sovereign 
bonds. The bonds are later sold successfully and South Korea considers 
raising a further $1 billion through further bonds issues. Moody's Investor 
Sen-ice lowers the outlook for Japan's sovereign debt rating from stable to 
negative. 











• http://pages.stern.n yu .eduF nrou binilasial Asiachronology. 
html, Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis and its global 
Contagion, accessed 07/11 / 2000. 
• http :www.pbs.org/wghh/pages/frondine/shows/crash/etc! 
cron.html, Frontline: the crash:timeline of the crash, accessed 
06/12/2000. 
• http:www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv Ibusiness/longrerml asiaeconltimeline.html, Timeline of 
the Asian crisis, accessed 13/11/2001. 
• Kaminsky G., Schmukler S., 1999. What triggers market 
jitters? A chronicle of the Asian crisis, Journal of 











Appendix G: EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS OF SAMPLE 
MEMBERS 
3 1 ~br( h 1997 _,I Mel reh 1998 J I Melreh 1999 3 1 ~1.IrC h 2000 J 1 ~ I Jr(h 2001 
ARG ENT INA Pegged tn US S Pegged to US S Cu rrenn" hOJrJ Currency bOJrd Currene," bo.lrd 
J.rr .. mgemcllt. Mr.tn ge mcnt .trrangcmcnt 
BRAZ IL ~ I Jnaged M.lnagcJ Indepcl1d cntl," InJependent !-- Independcnth-
!'Ioatin o Floatin ? no.lling nOJt in o noatin a 
CHINA lvI.Jnaged Man.lged Fixed peg Fixed peg Fixed peg 
FloJting Floatin o Jrrangement "lrrano ement .lrr.lO oemcnt 
CZECHOS LOV AKLA Pegged to ManageJ Managed I- IJI1 ,'ged M., naged 
Lomposite of Floatin g no,lling ,," ith no nOJting ,,"ith no nOJting with no 
currenCies pre.lI1n OllnccJ rrcannollneed pre.lIlnoullced 
pJil1 fur r.llh for r at h for 
exchJnge ral e cxchan Qc Lac cxclulloe rat e 
PANAMA Pegged to US S Pegged to US S Ex(h.ange r .He Exchan ge rdte ExchJnge rate 
" ith no scpJr.lle with no separate ""ith no separate 
leg.ll tcnder legal tender legal tender 
PERU Indel'cndcntly Indepcndently Independently Indepcndentl," Independenth-
Iloar ing fl otHing nO~lI in g fl oJting fl o'lling 
PHILIPPINES Independentl," Independent"" Independentl y Independentl," Independently 
floating /l odt ing noating float ing noating 
PO LA ND Ma na ged Managed ExchJnge r.It es Exchange rates Independen tl , ' 
fl oating nam ing ~' ithin CL1 ·", lln g within crJ,,"lin g !loating 
band band 
arranvemenl .1[r,lOOcment 
RUSSI A Managed w!Jnaged MJn,'gcd Independentl'" t- 1.lI1aged 
floJting fl oJting noating ,," ith no fl oating no;}ting wit h no 
preannounced preJnnounceJ 
path for path for 
exc hanoe rale exchanoe rcHe 
SOUTH AFRlCA Independentl," Independently Independently Independentl,' Independen tl y 
/loatin o /l oating OO;:1(ino /loatin o noating 
SOUTH KOREA Managed Independen tl y Independently Independentl ," Independentl ," 
floating noating fl oating no.ning fl oating 
THAfLAND Pegged to J Man.lgcd Independent h- Independenth- Independent':' 
composite of fl oating floating floJting floating 
currenCies 
VENEZ UELA Managed Managed Exchange rates Exc hange rdtes Exc hange rates 
noat ing Iloaring ,,"ithin crJ,,"ling within crawling within cra,,"Iin g 
banJ band band 
arrangement .urangcm e nt ;ur Jngement 
Source: IMF (1997), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997 
IMF (1998), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1998 
IMF (1999), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1999 
IMF (2000), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2000 
IMF (2001), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001 
IMF (2002), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2002 
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Appendix H: MACRO-ECONOMIC DA T A CORRELATION TESTS 
Correlation table for current account statistics 
\RGENTI PHILlPPI 
NA BRAZ IL CZECH CHIl'\A MEXICO NES POLAND RUSSIA S AFR ICA S KOREA 
ARGENTINA -o.n -0. 12 11 /,1 -o.os 0. 13 ilia 0.20 0. 10 -0.27 
BRAZIL 0.72 0.7 1 Il /d 0..J3 -0. 13 il ia -0.27 -0.44 -0.26 
CZEC H -0.07 0.06 n/d 0.88 -0.33 nla -0.62 -0.34 0. 15 
CHINA -0.61 -0.92 -0.07 nla il ia il ia nla n/d nla 
MEXICO 0.10 0.54 -0.42 ·059 ·':'.3 1 nh -0.72 · ~.39 0.49 
PHILIPPINES 0.24 -0.0 1 0.55 0.11 ·083 nh 0.26 ·0.43 0.2 1 
[)OLA ND 0.19 0.4-1 ·0. 17 -0.55 286 -0.80 nla Ilh nh 
RUSSIA 0.69 0."\1., 0.13 -0.15 .~ .)-I 0.82 -0.58 0.1-1 ·0.43 
S AFRICA 0. 38 0.17 0.24 -0.02 -065 0.9 1 -0.79 0.92 0.04 
S KOREA -0.43 -0.56 0.72 0. 51 -0.84 0.66 -063 0.1 4 0.34 
VENEZUELA 0.81 0. -14 -0.46 ·0.29 ·0.06 0.30 -0.19 0.79 0.58 -G.46 
The above table gives the correlation between the sample country's current 
accounts. The current account is the sum of the balances on goods, services, 
income and current transfers. This is in effect a correlation of the trade 
taking place between the home country and the rest of the world. The 
correlation statistics below the diagonal are based on annual data ranging 
from 1995 to 2001 (or the latest data available), whereas the correlation 
statistics above the diagonal are based on quarterly data ranging from the 
beginning of 1999 to 2001 (or the latest data available). N/ A indicates that 
data was not available. 
Correlation table for financial account statistics 
:\RGENTI PHILIPPI 
';\.A BRAZIL CZEC H CHIK\ MEXICO NES POLAND RUSSIA S Af'R[CA S KORE A 
ARGFKlIl'\f\ -J.\9 0.59 n/" C.43 -0.13 n/ a 0.01 0.05 0.65 
BRAZIL -0. 48 0.09 n/ a 0.53 -0.3S n/a -0.22 -0.03 -0.1 8 
CZECH -0 13 0. 35 nla C. 12 -0.56 n/a -':'86 -0.43 ':'.10 
CHI A -0.54 0.59 0.56 nla nh n/a Il/d nla n/d 
MEX ICO 0.28 -0.41 -0.92 -0.79 -0.27 n/a -':'. H 0.09 0.27 
PHILIPPINES -0.2 -1 0.39 O.IS O.SI -0 .5-1 n/a ').33 0.23 O.}} 
PO LAND 0.67 -0.52 -om -0.81 0.30 -0.68 Ill" n/ a nla 
RUSSIA -0. 31 -0.20 0.05 0.26 -O.D 0.50 -0.08 0.19 ~.09 
S AF RICA -0.20 -023 -0.:'5 0.20 -c. ';9 0.59 -0. 18 0.92 0.05 
S KOREA -0.02 0.33 0.6) '156 ·').53 0.1 6 -0. -1 0 ·0.56 -0. 59 
VENEZUELA,. o.} 1 -0. 4':' -0.!..9 -0.41, v )1 0. 11 0.32 0.52 0.70 ·0 88 
The above table gives the correlation between the sample country's financial 
accounts. This is the sum of the direct investment, portfulio investment, 
financial invest ment and other investments moving in and out of the 
country. If international investors regard two countries as similar, then the 














































below the diagonal are based on annual data ranging from 1995 to 2001 (or 
the latest data available), whereas the correlation statistics above the diagonal 
are based on quarterly datd ranging from the beginning of 1999 to 2001 (or 
the latest data available). N/ A indicates that data was not available. 
Unfortunately given the low frequency and short time period at hanJ, it is 
not possible to l1raw any conclusions from the above tests . The frequency of 
data does not cover the crisis in sufficient detail. The dynamic nature of 
emerging markets as well as globalisation would make results based on a 
longer stream of historical data useless for the purposes of this research. 
Nonetheless, similar correlations tests were performed on other 
components of the capital accounts such as Direct Investment in the home 
country by foreigners as well as Equity Securities Liabilities, which reflect 
instruments, held by foreigners that usually reflect ownership. The 
correlation tables are included below. 
Correlation table for Direct Investment account statistics 
ARGENTI PHILIPPI1\; 
NA BRAZIL CZECH CHINA MEXICO ES POLAND RUSSIA S AFRICA S KOREA 
-0.10 -027 nla -0.45 -O.4 J nla -0.06 -0.17 -0.18 
0.19 0.38 nh -0.31 C.25 n/a 0.17 -0.37 :.41 
0.55 0.67 nh -O.~ I -0.59 nla 0.25 008 :.70 
-0. 23 -0.54 -0.83 nla n/,) nla Il ia Ilia Ill" 
0.08 0.77 0.-1: -0.33 0.28 Ili a 0.12 -0.25 0.42 
-0.85 0.30 -0.22 0.26 -0.01 Ilia -0.34 -0.'21 -0.26 
0.06 0.88 OIl -0.87 0.74 C.21 Il / d I n / J Ilia 
O.3C 0.22 -0. 19 0.53 0.61 -0.4?' 0 .0 1 -0. 15 0.49 
018 -0.13 -0.37 0.4 -1 C.43 -0.47 -0.25 0.90 -0.20 
0.37 0.8 I 0.9 1 -0.% 0.66 -0.11 0.94 0.05 -0. 2-1 
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Correlation tab,e for Equity Investment Liability account statistics 
ARGEN PH[UPP[f' 
TINA BRAZIL CZ ECH CHINA MEX[CO ES POLAN D RUSS[A S AFRICA S KOREA 
-0.69 -0.60 n la 0.00 -0.53 o / a -0.48 -0. 20 -0. 12 
0.04 0.5 1 nt'a 0.04 0,}1 nh 0.19 -0. 12 0.07 
-0.58 -':~.49 n/J 0.17 0.15 I1h 0.81 -0.20 0,04 
-0.45 0.23 -0. 31 nh 11/,1 Of ,I nh 11/,1 nl <1 
0.68 0.70 -0.85 -0.0 1 ·0 .11 n/ . -0,07 0.77 -0.07 
0. 16 0.31 -0.10 -0.6,) C.29 nh -004 -0.18 -0,20 
-0.32 -0.00 -0.05 0.74 -C30 ·')J,S 11 1 J Il l. 11 / .1 
-0.33 0,48 -0.0.1 ·0.06 0.22 0,61 -0 62 -0.12 -005 
0.54 -0.6(, -0.29 -0.08 0,04 -0.28 -0.06 -0.14 -0.09 
0.25 0.08 -0.5 1 0,27 0.19 0,02 060 -0.5 2 0. 11 
0.22 0.60 -0.33 -0. [8 0.67 0.10 -on 0.75 -0,20 -0.55 
Data sourced from: 
fMF (1997), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997 
fMF (1998), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1998 
IMF (1999), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1999 
IMF (2000), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2000 
IMF (2001), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001 
IMF (2002), International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2002 
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